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I. INTRODUCTION
From the perspective of today’s cultural zeitgeist, police officers are either noble keepers of
civilization or wicked manipulators of justice. Officers either chivalrously lay down their lives to
protect the public, or corruptibly oppress the downtrodden. As with many things, however, the
truth lies somewhere between these two extremes, and generally varies along this spectrum on a
case-by-case basis. Unfortunately, the criminal justice system operates on this extreme binary
system of police credibility: officers are either honorable or, if thoroughly convinced, horrible.
Justice Warren Burger succinctly summarized the judiciary’s long-standing view of officer
testimony 1 half a century ago.
[I]t would be a dismal reflection on society to say that when the guardians of its
security are called to testify in court under oath, their testimony must be viewed
with suspicion. This would be tantamount to saying that police officers are
inherently untrustworthy. The cure for unreliable police officers is not to be found
in such a shotgun approach. 2
According to the judiciary, then, officers are presumed gallant. At the same time, juries are
currently instructed to treat police officer testimony as though it came from any other witness. 3
This method presumably attempts to assuage jurors who may view police testimony as
irreproachable. Instead, such an approach sweeps many problems associated with police
testimony under the proverbial rug. 4 It seems imbalanced for courts to acknowledge police as the
“guardians of its security,” a view shared by many in the public, but only offer a few sentences
within jury instructions ordering jurors to treat officers as any other witness. In the face of the
strong favorable bias currently attached to police testimony by certain juror demographics, such
a blasé attempt to convince a jury to treat these judicially proclaimed heroes as merely any other
witnesses is not an effective solution.
Viewing police testimony from the courts’ binary perspective obfuscates the real problem.
Instead of painting the issue as one concerned with the inherent trustworthiness of officers, this
article suggests recommendations that seek to make the criminal justice system fairer in its
outcomes. The main recommendation of this article is to introduce cautionary jury instructions in
certain cases where police officers testify, while a secondary recommendation concerns using
specific voir dire questions to obtain a fairer jury. These recommendations would simply be
continuing the trend of bettering the justice system, both through police practices and courtroom
procedures, by giving juries awareness of the true role and power that officers have in the
criminal courts.

1

Justice Warren Burger wrote this opinion before he became the Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court.
2
Bush v. United States, 375 F.2d 602, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
3
Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police Officer Witnesses
with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245, 256 (2017).
4
Id.
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In Part II, this article outlines the problem of unearned, implicit credibility given to police officer
testimony by juries, as well as the reasons behind this problem’s existence. Part III examines the
negative effects of this issue on the criminal justice system, including police officer conduct and
the various consequences of wrongful convictions. Part IV offers recommendations to address
this problem, such as cautionary jury instructions and voir dire questions to identify jurors most
likely to take police testimony at face value. Finally, Part V provides a conclusion to this article.
II. THE PROBLEM: JURORS OFTEN GIVE OFFICER TESTIMONY IMPLICIT CREDIBILITY FOR NO
GOOD REASON
A. Why Officers Gain Credibility from Juries by Merely Being Officers
Police officers inhabit a unique role in society. As noted by former Chief Justice Burger, officers
act as the protectors of society, and in that role interact with members of the public who vary in
economic, racial, and social status. The perception of police tends to vary drastically among
these different demographics, and is especially pronounced among different racial groups. 5
Specifically, white, upper-middle class Americans are about twice as likely to have a positive
view of police as African-Americans. 6 While the reasons for these different perceptions are
numerous, one disproportionate cause is both the real and perceived discrimination against
minorities within the criminal justice system.
Discrimination against minorities in the criminal justice system has been well documented. 7 One
particularly noteworthy example is the fact that African-Americans are imprisoned at over five
times the rate of white Americans in state prisons, despite making up a much smaller portion of
the overall population. 8 While this statistic alone may not be dispositive proof of discrimination,
it should at least raise eyebrows.
Another curious issue generally not discussed in the public sphere is that cities in need of
revenue often end up ticketing minority populations disproportionately to white populations. 9
5

Terry Smith, Speaking Against Norms: Public Discourse and the Economy of Racialization in the
Workplace, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 540 (2008) (discussing white, black, and Hispanic views on police
satisfaction by demographic).
6
Rich Morin et al., The Racial Confidence Gap in Police Performance, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept.
29, 2016), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/09/29/the-racial-confidence-gap-in-police-performance/.
7
Mario L. Barnes, Criminal Justice for Those (Still) at the Margins-Addressing Hidden Forms of Bias
and the Politics of Which Lives Matter, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV.712–16 (2015) (examining certain implicit
biases which create a broad variance in the way racial groups are treated at various phases in the criminal
system); Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug War,
Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851 (2002); see German Lopez, American policing is
broken. Here’s how to fix it, VOX (May 2, 2017, 9:24 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2016/11/29/12989428/police-shooting-race-crime/.
8
Ashley Nellis, The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in State Prisons, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT (June 2016) at 3, http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-ofJustice-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf.
9
German Lopez, Study: cities rely more on fines for revenue if they have more black residents, VOX (July
7, 2017, 8:01 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/7/7/15929196/police-fines-study-racism.
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Interestingly, these citations fell on average by about fifty percent after the election of one black
person onto city council. 10
Yet another disconcerting issue with racial implications is the differential punishment associated
with crack cocaine versus powdered cocaine, despite the fact both drugs are nearly identical in
their chemical makeup. 11 Individuals who use crack cocaine have a higher likelihood of being
black, low-income, and less educated than those who use powdered cocaine. 12 For example, in
2015, 87% of prisoners convicted in federal court of crack offenses were black, 13 while the racial
statistics of powdered cocaine offenses were far less skewed. 14 Those charged with possessing
one gram of crack cocaine generally face the same sentence as those found with 18 grams of
powdered cocaine. 15 While one would expect such unfairness to have simply been overlooked or
unexamined, this wide sentencing disparity exists after already having undergone reform. 16 The
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 lowered the sentencing gap between crack and powdered cocaine
from 100:1 to the current 18:1 ratio. 17 In other words, before 2010, those who possessed one
gram of crack generally received a similar sentence to those in possession of 100 grams of
powdered cocaine. 18 Such a contrast at least gives the appearance of unfairly targeting black,
low-income, and less educated individuals. 19

10

Id. Similarly, in schools, one study has shown African-American children receive harsher punishments
than white students, which likely does nothing to allay perceptions of unfairness attributed to authority
figures later in life. See Russell J. Skiba, Suzanne E. Eckes, & Kevin Brown, African American
Disproportionality in School Discipline: The Divide Between Best Evidence and Legal Remedy, 54
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1071, 1088 (2010) (citing Anne C. McFadden & George E.
Marsh, A Study of Race and GenderBias in the Punishment of School Children,
15 EDUC.
&
TREATMENT CHILD 140, 140–47 (1992)).
11
Elizabeth Kulze, How Crack Vs. Coke Sentencing Unfairly Targets Poor People, VOCATIV (Feb. 22,
2015, 12:14 PM), http://www.vocativ.com/underworld/drugs/crack-vs-coke-sentencing/ (citing Joseph J.
Palamar et al., Powder cocaine and crack use in the United States: An examination of risk for arrest and
socioeconomic disparities in use, 149 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 108, 114 (2015)).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Danielle Kurtzleben, Data Shows Racial Disparity in Crack Sentencing, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 3, 2010,
2:45
PM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/08/03/data-show-racial-disparity-in-cracksentencing.
15
Elizabeth Kulze, How Crack Vs. Coke Sentencing Unfairly Targets Poor People, VOCATIV (Feb. 22,
2015, 12:14 PM), http://www.vocativ.com/underworld/drugs/crack-vs-coke-sentencing/ (citing Joseph J.
Palamar et al., Powder cocaine and crack use in the United States: An examination of risk for arrest and
socioeconomic disparities in use, 149 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 108, 114 (2015)).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Likewise, at least one study has shown that officers are consistently more likely to use greater force on
minority suspects than with white suspects. See also Cristal Harris, Dark Innocence: Retraining Police
with Mindfulness Practices to Aid in Squelching Implicit Bias, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 103, 112 (2017) (citing
Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot,
92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006 (2007)).
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Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the issue of race when selecting jurors due
to the prevalence of discrimination by prosecutors nationwide. Over 40 years ago, the Supreme
Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to deny someone the opportunity to serve on a jury based
on their race. 20 Although the Supreme Court recognized a significant problem with jury
selections, and its ruling likely had some positive effect, the ruling is still criticized for allowing
prosecutors to mask their peremptory challenges in neutral language, which has the effect of
removing minority jurors. 21
While issues of racial discrimination are a problem all their own, these issues are often
compounded because of the lack of jury diversity. 22 Many times, the jury pool looks much
different than the defendant, as juries across America tend to be white and upper-middle class. 23
Instead of being tried by a jury of one’s peers, a defendant usually finds himself facing “peers”
with a higher economic class, lighter skin tone, different social background, and inability to truly
empathize with the defendant’s circumstances. 24 This problem is pronounced with race,
especially in regard to African-Americans. 25 For example, one study found all-white juries
convict black defendants 16% more often than white defendants. 26 However, when at least one
African-American was included in the jury pool, the racial conviction gap fell to nearly even. 27
Moreover, individuals with a more positive perception of police have a higher probability of
obeying officer commands, engaging in crime stopping activities, and, critically, supporting
prosecution theories of evidence. 28 Studies have shown broadly that white jurors are more

20

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
See also Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory
Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 503 (1996) (defining the legacy of Batson as a failure and
seeking the abolishment of peremptory challenges); Parker Kelly, Racial Discrimination in Jury
Selection: The Failure of Batson Challenges and Potential Solutions, GW JUSTICE J. (Nov. 19, 2016),
https://www.gwjusticejournal.com/single-post/2016/11/19/Racial-Discrimination-in-Jury-Selection-TheFailure-of-Batson-Challenges-and-Potential-Solutions (explaining prosecutors hide racial challenges with
neutral reasons for removing minority jurors).
22
Ashish S. Joshi & Christine T. Cline, Lack of Jury Diversity: A National Problem with Individual
Consequences, AMERICAN BAR (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees
/diversity-inclusion/articles/2015/lack-of-jury-diversity-national-problem-individual-consequences.html
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Vivian Ho, For SF’s black defendants, it’s hard to find jury of peers, SF CHRONICLE (March 4, 2017),
http://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/For-SF-s-black-defendants-it-s-hard-to-find-10977625.php.
26
Steve Hartsoe, Study: All-White Jury Pools Convict Black Defendants 16% More Often than Whites,
(April 17, 2012), https://today.duke.edu/2012/04/jurystudy.
27
Shamena Anwar et al., The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal Trials, Q. J. ECONOMICS (2011) at 3,
http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1349&context=heinzworks.
28
Amy Farrell, Liana Pennington, & Shea Cronin, Juror Perceptions of the Legitimacy of Legal
Authorities and Decision Making in Criminal Cases, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 773, 793 (2013).
21
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accepting of the prosecution’s theories of evidence, while African-American jurors are more
suspicious, especially concerning police testimony. 29
Therefore, the lack of jury diversity has two troublesome components. Not only are the white,
upper-middle class individuals that generally serve on juries implicitly unable or unwilling to
identify with certain defendants, but these same jurors, who generally view police favorably, are
more willing to sympathize with the prosecution and police testimony. When faced with these
facts, the purported gap in convictions based on race suddenly becomes more understandable. 30
Distortions of the judicial system are not limited to race, as many people exhibit both implicit
and explicit biases in favor of authority figures. 31 Authority and the effects of obedience have
been long studied, 32 and a link exists between authority-biased jurors and defendant
convictions. 33 The company of such jurors in a jury pool leads to a higher conviction rate, even
when evidence is slanted toward the defendant. 34 The presence of authoritarian jurors appear
even more problematic when viewed with the ancillary problem of implicit police credibility, as
such jurors may have a broader impact on convictions than previously realized, especially if
many other jurors already implicitly favor the prosecution.
Unfortunately, the need for juries to scrutinize officers on the stand is not simply theoretical, as
implicit credibility towards police testimony can lead to a host of untoward consequences within
the criminal system.
III. THE EFFECTS: NOT GREAT FOR THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
A. Unsubstantiated Officer Credibility Leads to Less Scrutiny of Police Conduct and Opens the
Door for Injustice
As previously discussed, the current composition of juries tends to be more favorable to the
prosecution and police. One manifestation of this bias is through increased credibility of police
29

Id. at 777; Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police
Officer Witnesses with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245 (2017).
30
Steve Hartsoe, Study: All-White Jury Pools Convict Black Defendants 16% More Often than Whites,
(April 17, 2012), https://today.duke.edu/2012/04/jurystudy.
31
See also Gayle W. Herde, Take Me to Your Leader: An Examination of Authoritarianism as an
Indicator of Juror Bias, THE JURY EXPERT (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2009/0 1/takeme-to-your-leader-an-examination-of-authoritarianism-as-an-indicator-of-juror-bias/ (citing Douglas J.
Narby, Brian Cutler, & Gary Moran, A meta-analysis of the association between authoritarianism and
jurors' perceptions of defendant culpability, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL 34, 34–42 (1993)); cf. Stanley
Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORM. PSYCHOL. 371 (1963) (examining the limits
and pressures of obedience on behavior).
32
Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORM. PSYCHOL. 371-78 (1963)
(examining the limits and pressures of obedience on behavior).
33
See also Douglas J. Narby, Brian Cutler, & Gary Moran, A meta-analysis of the association between
authoritarianism and jurors' perceptions of defendant culpability, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL 34, 34–42
(1993)).
34
Id.
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testimony. Such unearned officer credibility creates an atmosphere of reduced scrutiny, as jurors
are more willing to take an officer at her word without the necessary analysis, reasoning, and
ultimate weighing of credibility. Less police scrutiny leads to problems for the judicial system,
especially because police officers, like anyone, are not perfect.
First of all, it is hard to be a cop. The average life span of a male law enforcement officer is
nearly 22 years shorter than men in the general public. 35 Officers generally carry higher levels of
stress than the average citizen, which is linked to a bevy of negative health effects. 36 These
effects include a higher prevalence of sleep disorders, diabetes, heart disease, brain cancer,
Hodgkin’s lymphoma and suicide. 37 Moreover, the stress and pressure of the job has an impact
on brain chemistry, as officers’ brains show a connection between trauma and a reduction in
decision-making, memory, and stress regulation. 38 Compounding these issues is the fact that 7%19% of active-duty police officers likely suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. 39 Perhaps
as a direct consequence of these factors, officers are more likely to die from suicide than in the
line of duty. 40 Operating under these pressures and difficulties, police sometimes make goodfaith mistakes both during an investigation and on the stand. 41 Such mistakes can be expected but
should be appropriately litigated and scrutinized in court by a jury cognizant of these issues.
Similarly, police officers are not necessarily in a position to be impartial, and juries are not told
of this fact. Officers work closely with prosecutors, and spend every day dealing with crime and

35

Stephen M. Soltys, MD, Officer Wellness: A Focus on Mental Health, 40 S. ILL. U. L.J. 439 (2016).
Ellen Goldbaum, Police Officer Stress Creates Significant Health Risks Compared to General
Population, Study Finds, UB NEWS CENTER (July 9, 2012), http://www.buffalo.edu/news/releases/
2012/07/13532.html (citing M.E. Andrew et al., The Buffalo Cardio-Metabolic Occupational Police
Stress (BCOPS) pilot study: methods and participant characteristics, PUBMED (Sept. 12, 2005),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16165369).
37
Id.
38
Erika Hayasaki, Life of a Police Officer: Medically and Psychologically Ruinous, THE ATLANTIC
(March 14, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/03/life-of-a-police-officer-medicallyand-psychologically-ruinous/284324/ (citing C. Chung et al., Symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder
and exposure to traumatic stressors are related to brain structural volumes and behavioral measures of
affective stimulus processing in police officers, PUBMED (Oct. 30, 2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/pubmed/23177923).
39
Charles R. Marmar, et al., Predictors of Posttraumatic Stress in Police and Other First Responders,
1071 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1, 18 (2006), https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/
74485/annals.1364.00?sequence=1.
40
Stephen M. Soltys, MD, Officer Wellness: A Focus on Mental Health, 40 S. ILL. U. L.J. 439 (2016).
(citing Pamela Kulbarsh, 2015 Police Suicide Statistics, OFFICER (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.of
ficer.com/article/12156622/2015-police-suicide-statistics).
41
Daniel N. Haas, Must Officers Be Perfect?: Mistakes of Law and Mistakes of Fact during Traffic Stops,
62 DEPAUL L. REV. 1035 (2013); Traci Pedersen, Study Finds Racial Disparities in Traffic Stops,
PSYCHCENTRAL,
https://psychcentral.com/news/2016/07/02/study-finds-racial-disparities-in-trafficstops/106086.html; Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the
Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851 (2002)
36
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criminals. 42 This sort of exposure has the potential to affect their outlook and perspective. 43 Due
to this viewpoint, some officers may hold implicit biases against individuals who are identified
as suspects. Even the Supreme Court has opined on this subject and long recognized that officers
engage in the “often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,” which may affect the ability
to be impartial. 44 Just as with good-faith mistakes made by officers, juries should be made fully
aware of police relationships with the prosecution and the potential for biases this engenders.
Additionally, unlike other witnesses who may testify only once in a lifetime, police officers are
“expert” fact witnesses. 45 Officers consistently understand more about courtroom procedure,
reasonable doubt, and the elements of a crime than lay witnesses, and they know how to
manipulate the system to their advantage if they choose to do so. 46
Unfortunately, some officers intentionally behave unlawfully. These officers engage in illegal
activities across a broad spectrum. 47 Such individuals actively and measurably diminish the
credibility of the judicial system with each indiscretion. While Justice Burger was not in favor of
a “shotgun approach” for cautionary jury instructions with police testimony, officers who act
illegally should not be allowed to continue unnoticed and unhindered merely because of their
status in the criminal system.
Compounding these issues is a lack of appropriate punishment for officers who engage in
unlawful behavior, especially when considering the unique role and power police have within the
judicial system. 48 While a lack of disciplinary action can be attributed to a number of factors ––
42

Howard Friedman, To Protect and Serve?, TRIAL, Dec. 7, 2011, at 14, 16 (citing David Harris, The
Interaction and Relationship between Prosecutors and Police Officers in the U.S., and How this Affects
Police Reform Efforts, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Erik Luna and
Marianne Wade eds., 2011) (examining the relationship between prosecutors and officers, and how this
relationship impacts police misconduct).
43
See also Cristal Harris, Dark Innocence: Retraining Police with Mindfulness Practices to Aid in
Squelching Implicit Bias, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 103, 112 (2017) (citing Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin
Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1006 (2007) (discussing that officers are consistently more likely to use greater force with
minority suspects than with white suspects)).
44
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).
45
Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1322 (1994) (“The problem is that some
officers have learned to describe investigations that conform to constitutional requirements - regardless of
the reality of the investigation.”).
46
Id.
47
Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police Officer
Witnesses with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245, 253 (2017); Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for
Police Lies, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010); Melanie D. Wilson, Improbable Cause: A Case for
Judging Police by A More Majestic Standard, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 259, 268 (2010) (finding police
perjury commonplace, beginning with a study in 1968 after Mapp).
48
Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" As Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A
New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233 (1998); David Harris, The Interaction and
Relationship between Prosecutors and Police Officers in the U.S., and How This Affects Police Reform
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including the strength of police unions, the reflexive instinct for police to protect other officers
from perceived attacks, and officers’ close relationships with prosecutors –– the buck ultimately
stops with the courts’ overall reluctance to address the issue. 49 Courts have been unwilling to
adequately deter police misconduct, and have generally avoided the perception of categorizing
police “as accomplices, drug addicts, or perjurers when it comes to weighing credibility,” even
when it appears warranted. 50 Moreover, officers know the risk of severe punishment is minimal
and that, even if caught, they would likely receive only “a court reprimand or, at most, a fairly
short jail sentence.” 51 Coupled with less scrutiny, some officers can more easily manipulate the
outcome of a case, while other officers may feel less risk associated with committing illegal acts.
An officer’s unlawful behavior may lead to severe consequences, if not for the individual officer,
then at least for the criminal justice system as a whole.
B. Less Police Scrutiny Leads to a Higher Wrongful Conviction Rate (And the Problems that
Accompany It)
Less scrutiny of police officer testimony can lead to a higher wrongful conviction rate 52 and all
of the problems (both direct and collateral) that accompany such convictions. 53 For one, an
atmosphere of unchecked police support in the courtroom allows otherwise discernable doublecounting problems to escape detection and multiply. Evidentiary double counting occurs when
one independent and one dependent piece of evidence are incorrectly viewed as two independent

Efforts, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, eds,
2011) (examining the relationship between prosecutors and officers, and how this relationship impacts
police misconduct); Connor Friedersdorf, How Police Unions and Arbitrators Keep Abusive Cops on the
Street, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/how-policeunions-keep-abusive-cops-on-the-street/383258/; Waseem Abbasi, Convictions are rare for officers in
police shootings, USA TODAY (June 17, 2017, 7:23 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation
/2017/06/17/convictions-rare-officers-police-shootings/102947548/.
49
Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" As Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A
New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233 (1998); David Harris, The Interaction and
Relationship between Prosecutors and Police Officers in the U.S., and How This Affects Police Reform
Efforts, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, eds,
2011) (examining the relationship between prosecutors and officers, and how this relationship impacts
police misconduct); Connor Friedersdorf, How Police Unions and Arbitrators Keep Abusive Cops on the
Street, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/how-policeunions-keep-abusive-cops-on-the-street/383258/; Waseem Abbasi, Convictions are rare for officers in
police shootings, USA TODAY (June 17, 2017, 7:23 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation
/2017/06/17/convictions-rare-officers-police-shootings/102947548/.
50
Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" As Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A
New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 264 (1998)
51
Id. at 272.
52
Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1133
(2013) (explaining how officer misconduct causes wrongful convictions).
53
Sarah B. Berson, Beyond the Sentence – Understanding Collateral Consequences, 272 NAT’L INST.
OF JUST. J. 25, https://www.nij.gov/journals/272/Pages/collateral-consequences.aspx.
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pieces. 54 An example of this issue would be an eyewitness identification combined with a
dubious confession gained through subsequent officer interrogation. On its face it would appear
the defendant had been identified and confessed; however, with a reasonable dose of scrutiny,
one hopes the veracity of the confession would be examined in the courtroom by a jury aware of
the potential issues.
Moreover, once these wrongful convictions come to light, the criminal justice system loses
important credibility with the public. 55 After a prolonged degradation of the courts’ credibility, it
is to be assumed that some people would start to question the usefulness of an unfair system of
justice. The reality or perception of allowing the judicial system to impose harsher penalties for
the same conduct based on a protected class (such as race) is unsustainable and continues to
whittle away at the courts’ credibility in the public sphere. 56
Finally, wrongful convictions (like any conviction) carry a host of collateral consequences. 57
Wrongful convictions can unjustifiably take years away from an innocent individual, isolate
them from family and friends, and lead to the inability to support themselves. 58 Any convicted
person will face employment issues, as those with a criminal record will likely find employers
less willing to “risk” hiring a convict. 59 Similarly, convicts can expect to face housing problems,
as certain areas will not rent to convicted individuals. 60 Even the children of convicts are
impacted, as they face higher rates of recidivism and incarceration, which leads to cyclical issues
for their family. 61
Taken together, these circumstances lay bare an unseemly and harmful problem: the current
composition of juries across the nation tend to favor the prosecution and police testimony, while
simultaneously disfavoring many defendants, simply because of the unknown (or sometimes,
known) presence of bias. Regarding police testimony, such unearned favor can lead to a
multitude of detrimental effects for the justice system. For these reasons, the current system
requires change.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: VOIR DIRE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS, AND OTHER SUGGESTIONS
54

Cf. Robert P. Mosteller, Pernicious Inferences: Double Counting and Perception and Evaluation
Biases in Criminal Cases, 58 HOW. L.J. 365, 380–83 (2015).
55
Cf. Matt Ford, Guilty, Then Proven Innocent, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.theatlantic
.com/politics/archive/2015/02/guilty-then-proven-innocent/385313/ (exposing flaws within the current
judicial system).
56
See Stephen B. Bright, Casualties of the War on Crime: Fairness, Reliability and the Credibility of
Criminal Justice Systems, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 413, 415 (1997); Elizabeth Kulze, How Crack vs. Coke
Sentencing Unfairly Targets Poor People, VOCATIV (Feb. 22, 2015, 12:14 PM), http://www.vo
cativ.com/underworld/drugs/crack-vs-coke-sentencing/ (discussing the racial implications of inconsistent
sentencing with crack and powdered cocaine).
57
Sarah B. Berson, Beyond the Sentence – Understanding Collateral Consequences, 272 NAT’L INST.
OF JUST. J. 25, https://www.nij.gov/journals/272/Pages/collateral-consequences.aspx.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
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A. The Judiciary’s Current Solution Is Inadequate
One case highlighting the criminal justice system’s current treatment of police is State v.
Williams. 62 In Williams, the defendant was charged with murder and, as part of his defense,
sought cautionary jury instruction that examined the credibility of law enforcement officers. 63
Defendant suggested the following jury instructions be given:
You have heard the testimony of law enforcement officials. The fact that a witness may
be employed by the federal or state government as a law enforcement official does not
mean that his testimony is necessarily deserving of more or less consideration or greater
or lesser weight than that of an ordinary witness.
At the same time, it is quite legitimate for defense counsel to try to attack the credibility
of a law enforcement witness on the grounds that his testimony may be colored by a
personal or professional interest in the outcome of the case.
It is your decision, after reviewing all the evidence, whether to accept the testimony of
the law enforcement witness and to give to that testimony whatever weight, if any, you
find it deserves. 64
This instruction does not appear on its face to be unreasonable, as it simply states police may not
be in a position to be impartial. Nonetheless, the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the
holding in Bush, stating that cautionary instructions were appropriately given to certain witnesses
in the underlying trial, which included one individual who received a plea deal and another who
may have been under a large amount of emotional and physical stress at the time of her
observation. 65 The court went on to state that “[s]pecial instructions concerning potentially
interested witnesses are proper . . . but they are inappropriate when, as here, there is nothing in
the record to cast doubt upon the truthfulness and objectivity of the witness.” 66 In other words,
even though the officer was engaged in a profession fraught with the potential for bias towards
suspected criminals, 67 because the record showed no misconduct or untruthfulness in this
particular case, it was proper for the lower court to refuse to give cautionary jury instructions
regarding the officer’s testimony. 68
By instructing juries to treat police as normal witnesses, the courts’ current solution to officer
testimony is flawed. Courts presumably are attempting to dispel the notion that officer testimony
62

State v. Williams, 430 S.E.2d 888, 895 (1993).
Id. at 894.
64
Id. at 895. These instructions appear relatively tame considering the later recommendations of this
article.
65
Id.
66
The court denied a request for special instructions regarding the credibility of police testimony. Id.
67
See also Cristal Harris, Dark Innocence: Retraining Police with Mindfulness Practices to Aid in
Squelching Implicit Bias, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 103, 112 (2017) (citing Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin
Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1006 (2007)).
68
It should also be noted the police officer’s testimony in Williams did not appear to be a substantial
portion of the State’s case against the defendant. Id.
63
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is unimpeachable, but, by ignoring a plethora of issues, such an attempt eventually has unwanted
effects. 69 Primarily, the judiciary expects a seemingly offhand instruction –– that officers should
be treated as any other witness –– to do an inordinate amount of work. As discussed, individuals
who currently serve as jurors generally have a more favorable view of police and the
prosecution. This perspective likely tips the scales of justice towards the prosecution. Instead of
addressing the presence of this advantageous bias and discussing the actual role police inhabit in
society, the courts simply tell jurors to treat officers as any other witness. These instructions
ignore the potential for inherent favoritism towards police that the average juror may knowingly
or unknowingly hold. 70
The recommendations of this article shouldn’t wither and die simply because the argument
against jury instructions is recast and viewed as an attempt to subvert officer trustworthiness in
general. Instead, these recommendations should be regarded as additional, relatively small steps
towards resolving problems within the criminal justice system. Acknowledging the potential for
implicit bias towards police credibility is merely one small (but significant) step in the right
direction.
B. Recommendation One: Provide Cautionary Jury Instructions Regarding Police Testimony To
Lessen The Implicit Bias Of Juries
The judicial system needs to acknowledge, through jury instructions, that many juries today give
officers an implicit boost in credibility. Such instructions would attempt to move any implicit
bias to the forefront of a jury’s consciousness, where it could be examined, dissected, and
ultimately rejected. The wording of these instructions would need to walk a thin tightrope, where
leaning too far to one side unfairly paints all officers as inherently untrustworthy (as noted by
Justice Burger), and leaning too far to the other side has no effect on juries at all.
1. Effectiveness of Jury Instructions in Other Areas of the Law
To avoid reinventing the wheel, one should examine the outcomes of cautionary jury instructions
given in other contexts of the law in crafting useful and convincing jury instruction language
regarding the credibility of officer testimony. Even if certain language for jury instructions
regarding officer testimony is unanimously deemed adequate by judges throughout the nation,

69

Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police Officer
Witnesses with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245 (2017); Michelle Alexander, Why Police Lie Under Oath,
NY TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/why-police-officers-lieunder-oath.html.
70
See also State v. Guilbert, 306 Conn. 218, 251, 49 A.3d 705, 731 (2012) (“[T]he reliability of
eyewitness identifications frequently is not a matter within the knowledge of an average juror.”).
Similarly, the average juror (who is generally white, upper-middle class, and holds a more favorable view
of police) cannot be expected to sufficiently identify and grapple with the unconscious favor given to
police from the current form of jury instructions. Just as with other areas of the law, certain jurors may
need to hear all of the facts to convince them that every officer does not fit the stereotypical mold of
friendly, helpful, and impartial.
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such language must successfully influence juries in order to be effective. Unfortunately, the
judicial system appears to still be searching for such effectiveness. 71 In general:
Studies are mixed as to whether instructions actually improve jurors' understanding.
Overall, research shows that jurors' comprehension of instructions is rather poor. Some
studies show modest improvement in juror understanding about procedural rules or
definitions of crimes, for example, while other studies show that instructed jurors are no
more knowledgeable than non-instructed jurors. 72
While other areas of the law have given specific cautionary jury instructions, 73 the effects of
these exact instructions have not been thoroughly studied. One area worth discussing, however,
are the different types of jury instructions given in eyewitness identification cases, as well as the
effect of such instructions.
2. Eyewitness Identifications: Effectiveness of Jury Instructions
This section examines three separate cases that have delved into the guidelines behind cautionary
jury instructions for eyewitness identifications. Each case, while similar, took a somewhat
different route to accomplish this task. This article takes an analogous approach by offering three
different versions of potential jury instructions regarding police credibility, and bases these
versions in part on the approaches discussed in the eyewitness identification cases within this
section.
In recent years, a litany of research has shown serious issues with eyewitness identifications, as
evidenced by the fact that 71% of wrongful convictions examined by the Innocence Project have
involved these types of identifications. 74 In fact, misidentifications are one the largest contributor
to wrongful convictions in the United States. 75 Due to the unreliability of these identifications
and the large role they play in the criminal justice system, courts across the nation have
attempted to address misidentifications through jury instructions.
Just as cautionary jury instructions with officer testimony would need to walk a tightrope to be
effective, so too must jury instructions for eyewitness testimony. “To be effective, safeguards
71

Laura Whitney Lee, Silencing the "Twittering Juror": The Need to Modernize Pattern Cautionary Jury
Instructions to Reflect the Realities of the Electronic Age, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 181 (2010) (examining
the effects of and ease of access to the internet on juries).
72
Tracy L. Denholtz & Emily A. McDonough, State v. Guilbert: Should Jurors in Connecticut Be
Educated About Eyewitness Reliability Through Expert Testimony or Jury Instructions, 32 QUINNIPAC
L. REV. 865, 923–24 (2015).
73
These areas include instructions involving testimony from defendants (although many courts merely
instruct juries to treat this testimony as if it were from any other witness), accomplices (especially when
uncorroborated), and informants. Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: Instructing Jurors to Consider the
Testimony of Police Officer Witnesses with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245, 260-261 (2017).
74
THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, DNA Exonerations in the United States, https://www.innocenceproject.or
g/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/.
75
THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, Eyewitness Misidentification, https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/
eyewitness-misidentification/.
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should maximize juror sensitivity to factors that influence the accuracy of an identification (i.e.,
the ability to discriminate between good and bad witnessing and identification conditions)
without inducing a general sense of skepticism regarding the ability of all eyewitnesses to make
correct identifications.” 76
Courts have looked to scientific data to address cautionary jury instructions for eyewitness
identifications. 77 Based on nearly universal scientific consensus, these instructions explain the
factors that research has shown may lead to a higher probability of misidentifications. 78 In 1996,
the court, in United States v. Burrous, offered a comprehensive and lengthy cautionary
instruction on many of these factors. 79 The beginning of this instruction summarized the dangers
of misidentifications as follows:
I want to caution you, first, that the kind of identification testimony you heard in this case
must be scrutinized carefully. Scientific studies have amply demonstrated the dangers of
mistake in human perception and identification. Of course, this does not mean that the
identification in this case is incorrect. I merely tell you this so that you understand the
importance of carefully evaluating the evidence here. 80
The court in Burrous then embarked on a cautionary instruction, which although not as
organized as the eyewitness instructions generally seen today, still discussed the factors of
misidentifications in length. 81 While this opening paragraph in Burrous laconically outlines the
issues surrounding eyewitness misidentifications, the court found it necessary to support this
opening statement with a litany of specific evidence behind it. 82 However, as discussed later in
this article, one potential approach to jury instructions for police credibility would be to offer a
similarly concise instruction in the form of a one-paragraph summary. While such an instruction
would lack effectiveness, it would at least acknowledge the problem and leave room for reform
down the road.
Nonetheless, other potential avenues for structured, scientific, and extensive eyewitness jury
instructions exist. For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court recently found certain factors
must be included in model cautionary jury instructions regarding eyewitness testimony. In
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Gomes, “the defendant slashed the face of the victim . . .
with a box cutter while the victim was sitting in the driver's seat of his vehicle.” 83 A nearby
76

Amanda N. Bergold et al., Comparing the Effectiveness of Instructions and Expert Testimony: Which
Safeguard Improves Jurors’ Evaluations of Eyewitness Evidence, J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIM. 7,
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6280-jonesbergoldetal.
77
United States v. Burrous, 934 F. Supp. 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Com. v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 470
Mass. 352 (2015) (holding modified by Com. v. Bastaldo, 32 N.E.3d 873, 472 Mass. 16 (2015); State v.
Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 208 N.J. 208 (2011) (holding modified by State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930, 208 N.J.
307 (2011))).
78
Com. v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 909-10 (Mass. 2015).
79
United States v. Burrous, 934 F. Supp. 525, 530-31 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Com. v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 899 (Mass 2015).
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convenience store clerk, the victim’s passenger, and the victim all later identified the
defendant. 84 At trial, the defendant requested a jury instruction that would have included many of
the scientific factors shown to increase the chances of a misidentification. 85 However, the judge
declined to do so. 86
On appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Court reviewed the lower court’s ruling and affirmed two
of the convictions. 87 Nonetheless, the court decided to incorporate certain factors that have
achieved “near consensus in the relevant scientific community” into model eyewitness
identification instructions. 88 Somewhat ironically, these factors appear to be substantially similar
to the factors proposed by the defendant in his underlying case. 89 The five factors listed by the
court included the following:
[1] Human memory does not function like a video recording but is a complex process that
consists of three stages: acquisition, retention, and retrieval . . . [2] An eyewitness's
expressed certainty in an identification, standing alone, may not indicate the accuracy of
the identification, especially where the witness did not describe that level of certainty
when the witness first made the identification . . . [3] High levels of stress can reduce an
eyewitness's ability to make an accurate identification . . . [4] Information that is
unrelated to the initial viewing of the event, which an eyewitness receives before or after
making an identification, can influence the witness's later recollection of the memory or
of the identification . . . [5] A prior viewing of a suspect at an identification procedure
may reduce the reliability of a subsequent identification procedure in which the same
suspect is shown. 90
The court then took these factors and created a model jury instruction. 91 This instruction
included approximately three pages of language that would be used in every case. 92 Portions of
the rest of the instructions were to be included only if evidence in the case made them relevant. 93
These portions delved more deeply into the original five factors listed by the court, and included
evidence such as whether an individual’s face was obscured, 94 a weapon was involved, 95 the
identification was cross-racial, 96 there was a lineup 97 or a witness viewed the defendant multiple

84

Id. at 901–02.
Id. at 902–03.
86
Id. at 904.
87
Id. at 905.
88
Id. at 909.
89
Com. v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 911-16 (Mass 2015).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 918–27.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 920–27.
94
Id. at 920.
95
Com. v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 920 (Mass 2015).
96
Id. at 921.
97
Id. at 924.
85
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times. 98 The court also made sure to note the potential need for revision of these model jury
instructions in the future. 99 While the jury instructions created in Gomes may seem thorough, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court actually relied on a prior case from New Jersey that went into
even greater detail and has been seen as a turning point in eyewitness identification
instructions. 100
In State v. Henderson, the New Jersey Supreme Court, relying on thousands of pages of
scientific research and data, recognized the effects of certain factors on misidentifications and the
importance of revising jury instructions for eyewitness testimony. 101 After discussing the need to
balance the defendant’s right to a fair trial and the State’s interest in presenting important
evidence, the court listed variables that lower courts should examine when dealing with
eyewitness identifications. 102 These variables were similar to those presented in Gomes but much
more in-depth. 103 Moreover, Henderson also included additional jury instructions that could be
implicated based on the presence of certain evidence in the case. 104
Since Henderson, the effect of these detailed instructions on juries has been examined, and the
results seem to show that, while jurors are impacted by such instructions, it’s not precisely how
the New Jersey Supreme Court likely intended: 105
An initial evaluation suggests Henderson instructions may minimize the risk of wrongful
convictions, but may not provide the educational function that results in sensitivity to the
quality of eyewitness factors. That is, mock jurors were less likely to convict when given the
Henderson instructions, regardless of whether the identification in question was secured
using good or poor police practices. 106
Jurors were indeed convinced to scrutinize eyewitness identifications more closely, but did so
uniformly, regardless of the specific facts and evidence of the case. 107 It would therefore appear
that Henderson might lean too far and instead bias jurors against all identifications. While one
study is not dispositive and more research is needed on these issues, these results, if correct,
98

Id. at 926.
Id. at 911.
100
Id. at 910.
101
Mark W. Bennett, Unspringing the Witness Memory and Demeanor Trap: What Every Judge and
Juror Needs to Know About Cognitive Psychology and Witness Credibility, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1331,
1372 (2015) (citing State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 208 N.J. 208 (2011) (holding modified by State v.
Chen, 27 A.3d 930, 208 N.J. 307 (2011)).
102
See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 208 N.J. 208 (2011) (holding modified by State v. Chen, 27
A.3d 930, 208 N.J. 307 (2011)).
103
See id.; Com. v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 910 (Mass 2015) (noting the court in Henderson eventually
led to the creation of a ten-page jury instruction for eyewitness identifications).
104
See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 920-22 (2011).
105
Amanda N. Bergold et al., Comparing the Effectiveness of Instructions and Expert Testimony: Which
Safeguard Improves Jurors’ Evaluations of Eyewitness Evidence, J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIM. 7,
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6280-jonesbergoldetal (noting potential methodology problems with
the study).
106
Id. at 9.
107
See id.
99
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would be unacceptable for the courts. Fortunately, other possibilities exist to help make
eyewitness instructions effective without broadly discrediting all identifications.
3. Eyewitness Identifications: Effectiveness of Jury Instructions When Offered In Plain English
One potential way to reduce the overbearing result of Henderson is to offer plain English
instructions. 108 Instead of inundating jurors with page after page of legalese and scientific jargon,
giving jurors a comparatively brief and understandable overview of the issues may help lead to
fairer outcomes. 109 A sitting federal judge has offered the following example of plain English
jury instructions:
[y]ou may believe all of what any witness says, only part of it, or none of it. In evaluating
a witness's testimony, consider the witness's:
• Motives for testifying;
• Interest in the outcome of the case;
• Drug or alcohol use or addiction, if any;
• The reasonableness of the witness's testimony. 110
Clear, simple, and straight-forward instructions like the excerpt offered above would likely do a
better job of educating jurors without unintentionally and relentlessly indoctrinating them into
believing eyewitness identifications (and police testimony) are always incorrect. Jurors already
have a difficult time comprehending jury instructions. 111 Giving juries the ability to grasp at least
an overview of the issues seems preferable to the current system, where many times jurors
cannot understand jury instructions and instead rely simply on a “gut feeling.” 112 While the
actual language of any jury instruction is important, another factor that may impact effectiveness
is the introduction of an expert to support such instructions.
4. Eyewitness Identifications: Effectiveness of Jury Instructions Accompanied by an Expert
Witness’s Testimony
Another potential way to more effectively walk the jury instruction tightrope would be to allow
expert witnesses to testify and explain faulty identifications to the jury. Expert testimony is
108

Mark W. Bennett, Unspringing the Witness Memory and Demeanor Trap: What Every Judge and
Juror Needs to Know About Cognitive Psychology and Witness Credibility, 64 AM. U. L. REV.
1331,1373 (2015) (citing See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 208 N.J. 208 (2011)).
109
Id. at 1375.
110
Id. at 1374. These instructions handle issues surrounding scientific research in a similarly modest
manner. Scientific research has established that memory is not an exact recording of past events and
witnesses may misremember events and conversations due to external stimuli that they may be exposed to
such as statements, conversations, opinions, documents, reports, etc. Even if a witness confidently
testifies in good faith, his memory may be distorted at any stage: acquisition, storage and retrieval
Such an approach would still adequately convey the issues surrounding eyewitness identification. Id.
111
Tracy L. Denholtz & Emily A. McDonough, State v. Guilbert: Should Jurors in Connecticut Be
Educated About Eyewitness Reliability Through Expert Testimony or Jury Instructions, 32 QUINNIPAC
L. REV. 865, 923–24 (2015).
112
Id.
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already generally viewed by the courts as a mechanism to aid jurors in their understanding and
ultimate deliberations. 113 Such an approach for eyewitness identifications (and implicit police
credibility issues) would presumably help juries obtain a more thorough understanding of the
science behind misidentifications, which would lead to more knowledgeable jurors coming to
more just outcomes: 114
[S]tudies show that jurors tend to “accept [expert testimony] and incorporate it into their
decision[-]making.” Research shows that jurors do not simply “suspend their own
judgment in deference to the expert,” but rather they “evaluate [the expert's testimony] in
light of [their] own experience, common sense, and recognition of the adversarial nature
of the trial process.” 115
Expert testimony would be especially useful where jurors have preexisting, incorrect beliefs on
certain subjects. 116 For example, the common juror may hold misconceptions regarding the
reliability and accuracy of a witness’s identification. 117 Expert testimony could allay some of
those misconceptions more effectively than jury instructions alone. 118
However, a large roadblock to obtaining an expert witness is the cost. Many criminal defendants
are indigent and assigned public defenders, who in turn are already underfunded and
overworked. 119 State-level public defenders often lack the financial resources and time to hire
every expert witness that would be helpful in a case. 120 Hiring an expert merely to clarify the
court’s jury instructions would likely be perceived as a much lower need for defendants. 121
Moreover, many state courts believe the absence of an expert to explain eyewitness
misidentifications is usually not a due process violation. 122 A potential reason for this view is
113

Id.
Id.
115
Tracy L. Denholtz & Emily A. McDonough, State v. Guilbert: Should Jurors in Connecticut Be
Educated About Eyewitness Reliability Through Expert Testimony or Jury Instructions, 32 QUINNIPAC
L. REV. 865, 923–24 (2015) (quoting Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence:
Social Framework Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 140, 172 (1989)).
116
See Tracy L. Denholtz & Emily A. McDonough, State v. Guilbert: Should Jurors in Connecticut Be
Educated About Eyewitness Reliability Through Expert Testimony or Jury Instructions, 32 QUINNIPAC
L. REV. 865, 894 (2015).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Oliver Laughland, The human toll of America’s public defender crisis, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 7,
2016, 6:55 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/07/public-defender-us-criminal-justicesystem.
120
See also id.
121
Fortunately, some progress has been made on the federal level for this issue. The United States
Supreme Court has found that an expert witness for an indigent defendant must provide a “significant
factor” to the defense so that the expert’s absence would otherwise make a fair trial impossible. Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82–83 (1985). Partially because of this ruling, there is funding for federal expert
witnesses available for to indigent defendants. National Research Council et al., Identifying the Culprit:
Assessing Eyewitness Identification (2014), https://www.nap.edu/read/18891/chapter/5#39.
122
National Research Council et al., Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification (2014),
https://www.nap.edu/read/18891/chapter/5#39.
114
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that state courts may believe experts in this situation tend to favor the defense more than the
prosecution. These courts presumably want to avoid placing a thumb on the scales of justice for
either side, and would therefore rather keep the defendant’s expert out of the courtroom on this
issue.
Similarly, allowing experts to explain misidentifications could lead to conflicting expert
testimony, which has the potential to confuse the jury. 123 Instead of clarifying the scientific
factors behind identifications, the issue for jurors could simply become more muddled. 124 Courts
have discretion to determine whether the benefits of expert testimony outweigh the costs, 125 and
could very well decide to exclude both prosecution and defense experts on the grounds of
keeping the issue relatively clear for juries, especially given the general reticence against experts
in this area. 126
Despite the potential benefits that expert testimony can bring to aid a jury’s understanding of
misidentifications, such an arrangement is likely unrealizable in the area of implicit bias towards
police testimony. 127 Scientific research on the implicit credibility of police testimony pales in
comparison to the study of eyewitness misidentifications. 128 Unlike with eyewitness testimony,
jurors’ implicit favor towards police does not have the well of scientific data from which to spur
change. While experts on this issue may currently be unobtainable, other avenues exist to
increase the effectiveness of cautionary instructions on juries.
5. Effectiveness of Jury Instructions Based on When They Are Given
The timing of the jury instructions may also impact their effectiveness to jurors. As one study
explained:
For example, instructions on reasonable doubt and burden of proof, when given at the
outset of the trial, increase jurors’ threshold for conviction and assist jurors in evaluating
evidence in line with legal standards. Eyewitness instructions given prior to an
eyewitness’ testimony may similarly assist jurors to evaluate such evidence. 129
While the cited study showed an increase in convictions, it also crucially showed an increased
ability for jurors to evaluate the evidence. 130 A juror who obtains the legal framework early can
123

Id.
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
See Virginia Hughes, Why Police Lineups Will Never Be Perfect, THE ATLANTIC, (Oct. 2, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/10/the-evolving-science-of-police-lineups/381046/
(noting it can take years before a scientific consensus emerges on a given topic, but especially when
“injecting science into the justice system”).
129
Amanda N. Bergold et al., Comparing the Effectiveness of Instructions and Expert Testimony: Which
Safeguard Improves Jurors’ Evaluations of Eyewitness Evidence, J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIM. 7,
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6280-jonesbergoldetal.
130
Id.
124
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thereafter observe the case through the lens of the pertinent evidentiary standard. Otherwise, the
juror must wait until the end of the trial to learn of the burden of proof, which is after the juror
has likely formed a non-legal opinion on the disposition of the case. Such reasoning for the
timing of jury instructions can be extended to instructions involving officer testimony. Jurors
who are instructed on implicit credibility issues for police testimony before such testimony
occurs would then likely be better equipped with the necessary knowledge to sufficiently inspect
such testimony more so than someone who learns of this unconscious bias after the fact.
Moreover, giving these instructions early will likely cause jurors to be “more alert and therefore
receptive to the new information earlier in the trial.” 131 Just as law students are generally less
receptive to learning new material in the classroom on a Friday afternoon, so too is a jury less
receptive to new information after several days (or even hours) of a trial. Therefore, giving these
instructions early would likely find jurors more open to the idea that jury bias in favor of police
exists, while also increasing the probability that these instructions would be remembered.
6. Bringing Everything Together: How to Effectively Phrase and Implement Cautionary Jury
Instructions Regarding Implicit Bias towards Police Officer Testimony
After examining other areas of the law, a sufficiently effective solution can be crafted to address
the issue of implicit police credibility. As discussed, the phrasing of cautionary jury instructions
would need to straddle the line between having no impact and causing jurors to view all officers
as inherently untrustworthy. In other words, these instructions would ideally dispel juries’
implicit (or explicit) biases in favor of police testimony, without going so far as to create biases
against officer testimony.
Part of the difficulty in completing this tightrope walk is the relative lack of research on the
effectiveness of jury instructions. However, some of the research completed on this topic
suggests a troubling outcome, as evidenced by the fact that the verbose and scientific approach
taken by the court in Henderson appeared to decrease convictions across the board, regardless of
the evidence. 132 Therefore, this article offers three different types of potential cautionary jury
instructions regarding jury bias in favor of police testimony (hereafter referred to as the “Brief
Instructions,” “Pragmatic Instructions,” and “Lengthy Instructions”). While the Brief Instructions
and Pragmatic Instructions offer a general, uniform template, the Lengthy Instructions would
take an approach similar to Henderson and Gomes, in that additional instructions may be
implicated based on the facts of the case. Moreover, some of these recommendations would be
131

The benefits of early exposure can be attributed to the primary effect seen when jurors tend to place
great emphasis on ideas to which they are first exposed, i.e. first impressions are lasting impressions.
Therefore, information presented during the earliest part of trial will be received, retained, and recalled
better than other evidence. Attorneys use the concept of primacy when structuring the order of witnesses
and exhibits by presenting high impact witnesses and exhibits first to make a stronger and more lasting
impression. Tracy L. Denholtz & Emily A. McDonough, State v. Guilbert: Should Jurors in Connecticut
Be Educated About Eyewitness Reliability Through Expert Testimony or Jury Instructions, 32
QUINNIPAC L. REV. 865, 925 (2015).
132
See Amanda N. Bergold et al., Comparing the Effectiveness of Instructions and Expert Testimony:
Which Safeguard Improves Jurors’ Evaluations of Eyewitness Evidence, J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIM. 7,
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6280-jonesbergoldetal.
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practical, straightforward, and ready to be applied, while others would require more research
before being implemented. This article will set the guidelines for each of these solutions while
also addressing potentially important issues surrounding their implementation.
While all three versions of the jury instructions offer different challenges and benefits, they also
share several common features, including being written in plain English, as opposed to highlytechnical legal jargon; the situations in which to give the instructions’ when during the trial the
instructions are given; and the presence of an expert witness to help explain the reasoning behind
the instructions.
7. Common Traits Shared Among the Jury Instruction Recommendations
First, any cautionary instructions on implicit police credibility should be used where an officer’s
testimony is a substantial portion of the prosecution’s evidence, regardless of the level of
offense. For the purposes of this article, “substantial” means that without such testimony, the
State’s case would have to be dismissed. This standard would probably lead to cautionary
instruction being given in cases involving misdemeanors and lower-level felonies, where police
would likely be an eyewitness to the crime. While the stakes in such cases are relatively low, this
area of the criminal justice system in particular would benefit from some level of reform, as the
vast majority of the public’s interaction with the criminal justice system occurs here. 133
Second, these instructions should be given at the beginning of the judicial proceeding. Just as
instructions on evidentiary standards have been shown to assist jurors in evaluating evidence, so
too could instructions regarding implicit police credibility. 134 Bringing awareness to this issue as
soon as possible would help juries evaluate testimony with as little bias as possible. Jurors would
learn about the issues surrounding implicit credibility before any testimony is heard, and would
view such testimony through this lens without having to retroactively apply it. The early timing
of these instructions would therefore equip juries with the knowledge to reliably evaluate
testimony and lead to fairer outcomes.
Third, to further increase the effectiveness of these cautionary jury instructions, the right to an
expert witness should be created. An expert could then explain many of the issues outlined in
this article regarding the implicit credibility given to police testimony by jurors. When dealing
with eyewitness identifications, expert witnesses can bring credibility and understanding to
issues of misidentifications for juries. 135 Experts could bring similar benefits to the issue of
police credibility. For example, experts have been shown to be particularly useful in dispelling
incorrect, preconceived notions held by jurors. 136 As previously discussed, the current
demographic makeup of juries across the nation tends to implicitly favor the prosecution and

133

See also Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 267 (2011).
134
Tracy L. Denholtz & Emily A. McDonough, State v. Guilbert: Should Jurors in Connecticut Be
Educated About Eyewitness Reliability Through Expert Testimony or Jury Instructions, 32 QUINNIPAC
L. REV. 865, 925 (2015).
135
Id. at 922–23.
136
Id. at 924.
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police testimony. 137 Just as some jurors may hold misconceptions and need to be convinced
misidentifications are a problem, so too may jurors need to hear more evidence supporting the
issue of implicit officer trustworthiness. 138 Therefore, similar to expert testimony regarding
eyewitness misidentifications, experts could offer further support to aid in effectively dispelling
implicit biases in favor of police testimony at trial.
Lastly, any cautionary instructions should be written in plain English to increase a jury’s
understanding. In general, the effectiveness of jury instructions is unacceptably low. 139 A large
part of this problem stems from a lack of comprehension. 140 While lawyers and judges train for
years to enter the courtroom arena, serving as a juror is often the first time a lay juror has
witnessed a trial. Instead of using highly technical, legal phrases, courts should strive to make
jury instructions as accessible and understandable as possible to all potential jurors. Therefore, in
order to balance the complexities of the issues being conveyed with the ability for all jurors to
understand those issues, all three types of the jury instructions recommended by this article will
use plain English as much as possible.
8. Recommendation One: The Brief Instructions
The Brief Instructions would offer an undeviating, general template for addressing juror bias in
favor of police testimony. The Brief Instruction would not be tailored to the particular facts of a
case, but would instead uniformly apply where an officer’s testimony is a substantial part of the
prosecution’s case.
The Brief Instruction would likely have the highest chance of implementation because of the low
level of effect it would have on juries. This instruction would hopefully bring some level of
awareness to jurors without creating prejudice against all officer testimony. However, just as the
courts’ current, fleeting instruction to treat police as any other witness likely does not alleviate
issues of implicit bias, the Brief Instruction would likely also not go far enough in effectively
addressing this issue. The Brief Instruction would be similar to the length and scope of the
summary paragraph of the eyewitness identification instructions given in Burrous and Williams.
It would read as follows:
I want to instruct you, first, that the kind of police officer testimony you will hear in this case
must be examined carefully. Scientific studies and judicial proceedings have shown the
difficulties, stresses, and potential for abuses inherent to policing.
At the same time, it is quite legitimate for defense counsel to examine the credibility of a
police officer on the grounds that her perspective may not be neutral.
Of course, this does not mean any of these issues are applicable in this case. Instead, I merely
say this so you understand the importance of carefully evaluating the evidence here.
137

Amy Farrell, Liana Pennington, Shea Cronin, Juror Perceptions of the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities
and Decision Making in Criminal Cases, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 773, 793 (2013).
138
Tracy L. Denholtz & Emily A. McDonough, State v. Guilbert: Should Jurors in Connecticut Be
Educated About Eyewitness Reliability Through Expert Testimony or Jury Instructions, 32 QUINNIPAC
L. REV. 865, 925 (2015).
139
Id. at 923–24.
140
Id.
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The Brief Instructions would likely not be as effective as other potential instructions, in part
because of the entrenched, positive views of police held by many jurors and in part because of
the brevity of the instructions. However, implementing these instructions would certainly be an
improvement over the current situation, and would serve as both an acknowledgement of an
issue within courtrooms across the United States, as well as a step towards remedying that
problem. While any progress on this issue would be noteworthy, the next recommendation would
do even more to increase the effectiveness of juries.
9. Recommendation Two: The Pragmatic Instructions
The second recommendation falls somewhere between the concision of the Brief Instructions and
the wordiness of the Lengthy Instructions. Like the Brief Instructions, the Pragmatic Instructions
would also contain an undeviating, general template for every case in which it is applied.
However, this template would be longer than the in the Brief Instructions and implicate certain
issues with more specificity.
The phrasing of the Pragmatic Instructions would look more like the instructions offered in
Gomes, which contained a relatively short, general template. However, unlike Gomes and
Henderson, no additional instructions would be given based on the facts of a case. The general
template would go farther than the Brief Instructions by getting more in-depth regarding the role
of police in the judicial system. Specifically, language similar to (but not limited to) the
following would be included:
Carefully weighing the credibility of police officer testimony is one way to ensure the
judicial system maintains its impartiality. Officers operate under higher levels of stress
than the general public, work closely with prosecutors, regularly testify in the courtroom,
and spend most of their time addressing crime and criminals. Due to this viewpoint,
officers may not be a neutral observer like the ordinary witness. Of course, this does not
mean any of those factors affect the officer’s credibility in this case. Instead, I merely tell
you this so that you understand the importance of carefully evaluating the evidence here.
This uniform script would more carefully straddle the thin line of simply dispelling implicit
biases than the Brief Instructions, in part because of its specificity. In other words, because the
Pragmatic Instructions would discuss the context of officers in the criminal system more
thoroughly, these instructions would have to be cautiously crafted to avoid decreasing
convictions across the board. Nonetheless, the Pragmatic Instructions, by illuminating the role of
the officer in the judicial system, would be more effective than the Brief Instructions in
dispelling issues of implicit bias in favor of police. However, these instructions would not stop
simply with the role of police, but would also go into issues surrounding juries today.
The Pragmatic Instructions would also inform juries of the problem presented by this article.
These instructions would discuss perceptions of local police, which generally follow trends
based on racial demographics. 141 Such instructions would also include an explanation that people
141

Terry Smith, Speaking Against Norms: Public Discourse and the Economy of Racialization in the
Workplace, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 540 (2008) (discussing white, black, and Hispanic views on police
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who view police more favorably are often more willing to accept officers’ statements at face
value and, as a result, are less likely to give such statements sufficient scrutiny. 142 This portion of
the Pragmatic Instructions would need to succinctly and successfully persuade jurors of the
potential existence of implicit bias.
While this article’s focus is on the implicit jury bias in favor of police testimony, its ultimate
goal is a fairer criminal justice system. In that vein, another important segment that could be
included in the Pragmatic Instructions might examine issues surrounding a defendant’s true
“peers.” 143 Here, these instructions would inform jurors as to the critical necessity of judging a
defendant on her conduct, and of not allowing biases concerning race, economic status, and
social background to affect the jury’s reasoning. This statement would be followed by a short
recitation of scientific research, which shows the dangers these implicit biases can wreak when a
defendant appears differently than jurors. 144 This way, juries would be better aware of the
heightened potential for unfair outcomes when these two issues are combined, and would
perhaps more closely scrutinize officer testimony and more fairly judge a defendant as a result.
The Pragmatic Instructions would outline these concerns in manageable chunks for the jury to
digest.
These instructions would likely be more effective than the Brief Instructions primarily because
of the greater specificity of the research backing up its content. The Pragmatic Instructions
would go a long way towards addressing the issue of jury bias in favor of police testimony, and
are this article’s foremost recommendation.
Also worth addressing, however, is an approach more closely akin to the Henderson court: the
Lengthy Instructions. The Lengthy Instructions, as its name implies, addresses the same issues
brought up in the Pragmatic Instructions, only much more comprehensibly.
Recommendation Three: The Lengthy Instructions
The Lengthy Instructions are the longest and most detailed rendition of the three
recommendations outlined in this article. Similar to the Pragmatic Instructions, the Lengthy
Instructions would contain a general template applicable to every case where an officer’s
testimony is a substantial portion of the State’s case. However, this template would go into even
greater specificity than the Pragmatic Instructions.
For one, these instructions would definitively include the main problem presented with this
article and the scientific research supporting it. This portion of the Lengthy Instructions would
delve deeper into these issues than the potential discussions offered in the Pragmatic Instructions.
satisfaction by demographic); Rich Morin et al., The Racial Confidence Gap in Police Performance, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016 /09/29/the-racialconfidence-gap-in-police-performance/.
142
Amy Farrell, Liana Pennington, Shea Cronin, Juror Perceptions of the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities
and Decision Making in Criminal Cases, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 773, 793 (2013).
143
Christine T. Cline et al., Lack of Jury Diversity: A National Problem with Individual Consequences,
AMERICAN
BAR
(2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/diversityinclusion/news_analysis/articles_2015/lack-of-jury-diversity-national-problem-individualconsequences.html.
144
Id.
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For example, issues involving implicit police bias with white, upper-middle class jurors would
be presented in a step-by-step fashion, similar to the progression of this article’s Section I.
Moreover, a similar, logical progression would address issues surrounding race and one’s
“peers.” 145
Second, instead of simply mentioning the high stress conditions in which officers operate, the
Lengthy Instructions would go into greater detail as to what those conditions are and how they
can affect decision-making and judgment. 146 Moreover, these instructions would examine the
effects of such conditions, including the higher prevalence of negative health conditions
experienced by officers and the implications associated with them. 147 These instructions would
also necessarily emphasize the fact that good-faith errors may occur under such difficult
conditions.
Third, the Lengthy Instructions would also thoroughly discuss the relationship between police
officers, prosecutors, and the police’s frequent dealings with suspects of a crime. 148 To this end,
the fact that officers are “expert” fact witnesses would also be examined. 149 Similarly, the
Lengthy Instructions would discuss the potential police misconduct and the corresponding lack
of punishment. 150 However, the police misconduct portion of the Lengthy Instructions would be
145

Id.
Erika Hayasaki, Life of a Police Officer: Medically and Psychologically Ruinous, THE ATLANTIC
(March 14, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/03/life-of-a-police-officer-medicallyand-psychologically-ruinous/284324/ (citing C. Chung et al., Symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder
and exposure to traumatic stressors are related to brain structural volumes and behavioral measures of
affective stimulus processing in police officers, PUBMED (Oct. 30, 2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/pubmed/23177923); Charles R. Marmar, et al., Predictors of Posttraumatic Stress in Police and Other
First Responders, 1071 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1, 18 (2006), https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstre
am/handle/2027.42/ 74485/annals.1364.00?sequence=1.
147
Erika Hayasaki, Life of a Police Officer: Medically and Psychologically Ruinous, THE ATLANTIC
(March 14, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/03/life-of-a-police-officer-medicallyand-psychologically-ruinous/284324/ (citing C. Chung et al., Symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder
and exposure to traumatic stressors are related to brain structural volumes and behavioral measures of
affective stimulus processing in police officers, PUBMED (Oct. 30, 2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/pubmed/23177923); Charles R. Marmar, et al., Predictors of Posttraumatic Stress in Police and Other
First Responders, 1071 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1, 18 (2006), https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstre
am/handle/2027.42/ 74485/annals.1364.00?sequence=1.
148
Howard Friedman, To Protect and Serve, TRIAL, Dec. 7, 2011, at 14, 16 (citing David Harris, The
Interaction and Relationship between Prosecutors and Police Officers in the U.S., and How this Affects
Police Reform Efforts, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Erik Luna and
Marianne Wade eds., 2011) (examining the relationship between prosecutors and officers, and how this
relationship impacts police misconduct).
149
Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1322 (1994) (“The problem is that some officers
have learned to describe investigations that conform to constitutional requirements regardless of the
reality of the investigation.”).
150
Mario L. Barnes, Criminal Justice for Those (Still) at the Margins-Addressing Hidden Forms of Bias
and the Politics of Which Lives Matter, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 712–16 (2015) (examining certain implicit
biases which create a broad variance in the way racial groups are treated at various phases in the criminal
system); Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug War,
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relatively brief compared to the rest of the instructions. Part of the reasoning behind this decision
would be to focus more on illuminating the potential implicit bias when viewing police
credibility, as opposed to creating the perception of attacking police officer credibility in general.
Topics generally regarded as an increase in credibility could, in this way, be cast in a different
light. For example, traditionally, a twenty-year veteran would appear as experienced and
proficient, which would in turn lead to a boost in credibility. However, when accompanied by the
relevant jury instructions detailing the potential health and personal effects of long-term policing,
jurors could also see an officer who has an altered perspective based on his dealings with
criminals, the prosecution, and the justice system over the course of two decades. Although
potential issues involving the credibility of a specific officer would likely be exposed at trial,
such instructions would help jurors reach fairer outcomes.
Another provocative idea would be to examine the composition of the jury and background of
the defendant in each case to determine whether additional instructions are necessary. Primarily,
this scenario would occur when an all-white jury faces a minority defendant. As discussed, the
conviction rates of an all-white jury and black defendant drop significantly when at least one
black individual is present on the jury. 151 It would therefore make sense to attempt to alleviate
this conviction gap with alternative measures, such as additional instructions, when a jury is
composed solely of white members. If these instructions were included in this section, then
discussion of this issue in the general template of the Lengthy Instructions could likely be
shaved, with a full discussion given only when relevant.
The idea behind the Lengthy Instructions is to fully draw back the curtain and allow juries to see
the entire picture. While the Brief Instructions and the Pragmatic Instructions primarily concern
themselves with examining the role, difficulties, and potential for partiality associated with
policing, the Lengthy Instructions would go a step further. These instructions would thoroughly
scrutinize the police while at the same time informing jurors that they themselves may not be so
impartial. Many jurors would likely need a substantial regiment of persuasion and evidence
before believing they may hold certain implicit biases, and the Lengthy Instructions would be in
a better position to deliver exactly that.
A potential drawback from the implementation of the Lengthy Instructions is the possibility of
painting all officers as inherently untrustworthy, thereby creating biases against police testimony.
Just as listing the scientifically verified factors in Henderson over a prolonged period of time
may have made jurors more doubtful on the usefulness of eyewitness identifications in any
situation, so too may the Lengthy Instructions carry a jury too far. After hearing so many
Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851 (2002); see German Lopez, American policing is
broken. Here’s how to fix it, VOX (May 2, 2017, 9:24 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2016/11/29/12989428/police-shooting-race-crime (examining comprehensive police misconduct).
151
Steve Hartsoe, Study: All-White Jury Pools Convict Black Defendants 16% More Often than Whites,
(April 17, 2012), https://today.duke.edu/2012/04/jurystudy; see also German Lopez, Study: cities rely
more on fines for revenue if they have more black residents, VOX (July 7, 2017, 8:01 AM),
https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/7/7/15929196/police-fines-study-racism (noting that traffic citations
of minority citizens fell more than fifty percent, in towns seeking additional sources of revenue, with the
election of one black individual to city council).
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potentially negative issues surrounding police, as well as attempting to alter the perspective a
juror may have previously held about herself, it would not defy logic to conclude juries would
likely exonerate defendants across the board, regardless of the strength of the evidence, when
such officer testimony and instructions are involved.
Of the three, the Pragmatic Instructions likely represent the best attempt to walk the tightrope
between being unheeded by juries and portraying all police as inherently untrustworthy. The
Pragmatic Instructions would outline several ostensibly radical ideas and give jurors enough
evidence to potentially convince them of the existence of implicit bias. For reasons likely
guessed, the Brief Instructions are probably too brief to make a significant impact, and the
Lengthy Instructions would go much too far for large swaths of the public. However, no progress
on this issue can be made if these issues are simply ignored. Unfortunately, the implementation
of any of these proposed instructions would likely fall flat in courtrooms across the nation.
10. Will Courts Actually Give These New Instructions?
Regrettably, courts would likely be unwilling to give any cautionary jury instructions regarding
police testimony for a litany of reasons. For one, courts have historically almost uniformly
refused to offer cautionary jury instructions regarding officer testimony. 152 Other than the
recently visible groundswell of activity from certain portions of the public, no momentous
transformation has occurred to spur courts to change. 153 Compounding this glacial movement is
the lack of research on this topic. The dearth of evidence on jury bias towards officers makes it
difficult not only to implement an effective instruction, but also to convince courts a problem
even exists. Courts would likely be hesitant to change decades, if not centuries, of precedent
without an abundance of evidence to support it, especially when it concerns the “guardians of
society.” 154
Moreover, even with the necessary research, it may take decades to effectuate change. One only
needs to look at the length of time it has taken the judicial system to recognize certain issues
surrounding eyewitness identification –– issues that have been known by the scientific
community for quite some time –– to see an example of this. 155 Coupled with this lack of
research, courts would continue to worry about unfairly prejudicing one side over the other in a
criminal trial.
C. Recommendation Two: Use Certain Voir Dire Questions To Remove Authoritarian Jurors
152

Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police Officer
Witnesses with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245, 250 (2017).
153
Mario L. Barnes, Criminal Justice for Those (Still) at the Margins-Addressing Hidden Forms of Bias
and the Politics of Which Lives Matter, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 712–16 (2015) (examining certain implicit
biases which create a broad variance in the way racial groups are treated at various phases in the criminal
system).
154
Bush v. United States, 375 F.2d 602, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
155
See Virginia Hughes, Why Police Lineups Will Never Be Perfect, THE ATLANTIC, (Oct. 2, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/10/the-evolving-science-of-police-lineups/381046 /
(noting it can take years before a scientific consensus emerges on a given topic, but especially when
“injecting science into the justice system”).
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Jury instructions can only be effective if jurors are willing to listen. Accordingly, the second
recommendation of this article suggests making courtroom verdicts fairer by selecting bettersuited jurors, especially in cases where police testimony is a substantial portion of the
prosecution’s case. Specifically, attorneys should seek to identify and remove jurors who exhibit
authoritarian tendencies from the jury pool. 156 These “authoritarian jurors” are not ideal
candidates for juries. 157
Authoritarian jurors are more likely to accept police officer testimony at face value than average
jurors, and also more likely to find a defendant guilty. 158 This is true even when the evidence is
decidedly in favor of the defendant: 159
[A] study of authoritarianism in the legal setting concluded that persons prone to convict,
even when the evidence was deliberately slanted toward innocence, scored higher in
authoritarianism than persons who acquitted, confirming previous studies showing that
high authoritarians tend to be punitive. Authoritarian jurors are more likely to convict in
criminal trials and are more severe in their punishments. 160
As a consequence, each additional authoritarian juror on a jury tends to increase both convictions
and the length of prison sentences, 161 and a jury composed entirely of authoritarian jurors
generally recommends sentences twice as long as juries without authoritarians present. 162
These types of jurors are detrimental to the criminal justice system. For one, the criminal system
strives towards consistency when it comes to sentencing. 163 Unfortunately, authoritarian jurors

156

This attempt to seek out authoritarian jurors should not be limited solely to defense attorneys.
Prosecutors have just as much an interest in securing the fair outcome of a case, in part because of the
harmful effects a wrongful conviction can play for the prosecutor personally, the defendant, and the
justice system in general. Sarah B. Berson, Beyond the Sentence – Understanding Collateral
Consequences, 272 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J. 25, https://www.nij.gov/journals/272/Pages/collateralconsequences.aspx.
157
See Gayle W. Herde, Take Me to Your Leader: An Examination of Authoritarianism as an Indicator of
Juror Bias, THEJURYEXPERT.COM (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2009/0 1/take-me-toyour-leader-an-examination-of-authoritarianism-as-an-indicator-of-juror-bias/ (citing Douglas J. Narby,
Brian Cutler, & Gary Moran, A meta-analysis of the association between authoritarianism and jurors'
perceptions of defendant culpability, 78 J APPLIED PSYCHOL 34, 34–42 (1993)).
158
Id.
159
Authoritarian jurors give higher probabilities to the likelihood a defendant is guilty. Id.
160
Id.
161
Dennis J. Devine et. al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating
Groups, 7 PSYCHOLOGY PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 633 (2001).
162
Id.
163
The need to strive for consistency is due to possible implicit biases that impact sentencing towards
various groups, such as different racial groups. Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court
Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 374–
75 (2010).
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unjustifiably skew both sentencing and convictions upwards. 164 In other words, whether a
defendant is convicted may turn solely on how many authoritarian jurors are present.
Furthermore, authoritarians increase the chance for variance among defendants convicted for
substantially similar acts. 165 Moreover, as previously discussed, any conviction carries with it a
host of collateral consequences. 166 Those consequences should not be increased simply because
an authoritarian juror is present. The unfairness and unwarranted harshness created by
authoritarian jurors is yet another way the credibility of the courts is strained, 167 and such actors
should be urgently removed from the courtroom. The best (and generally only) opportunity to
identify these jurors is during voir dire, and both prosecutors and defense attorneys should
carefully consider which questions to ask to weed out authoritarian jurors.
1. Composition of Voir Dire Inquiries
Studies have been completed on effectively identifying individuals who exhibit strong
characteristics of authoritarianism. 168 Some of these questions appear on the nose, especially
when read or asked one after the other. Therefore, attorneys should carefully consider which
questions to ask, when to ask them, and how to ask them. Several such inquiries, which can be
used to elicit a yes or no response from a juror, are as follows:
-

-

Too many obviously guilty persons escape punishment because of legal technicalities.
The law coddles criminals to the detriment of society.
Upstanding citizens have nothing to fear from the police.
The freedom of society is endangered at least as much by overzealous law enforcement as
by the acts of individual criminals.
It is better for society that several guilty men be freed than that one innocent man be
wrongfully imprisoned.
Citizens need to be protected against excess police power as well as against criminals.

164

See Gayle W. Herde, Take Me to Your Leader: An Examination of Authoritarianism as an Indicator of
Juror Bias, THEJURYEXPERT.COM (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2009/0 1/take-me-toyour-leader-an-examination-of-authoritarianism-as-an-indicator-of-juror-bias/ (citing Douglas J. Narby,
Brian Cutler, & Gary Moran, A meta-analysis of the association between authoritarianism and jurors'
perceptions of defendant culpability, 78 J APPLIED PSYCHOL 34, 34–42 (1993)).
165
See Dennis J. Devine et. al, Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating
Groups, 7 PSYCHOLOGY PUB. POL’Y & L. 622 (2001).
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Sarah B. Berson, Beyond the Sentence – Understanding Collateral Consequences, 272 NAT’L INST.
OF JUST. J. 25, https://www.nij.gov/journals/272/Pages/collateral-consequences.aspx.
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See Stephen B. Bright, Casualties of the War on Crime: Fairness, Reliability and the Credibility of
Criminal Justice Systems, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 413, 415 (1997); Elizabeth Kulze, How Crack vs. Coke
Sentencing Unfairly Targets Poor People, VOCATIV.COM (Feb. 22, 2015, 12:14 PM),
http://www.vocativ.com/underworld/drugs/crack-vs-coke-sentencing/ (citing Joseph J. Palamar et al.,
Powder cocaine and crack use in the United States: An examination of risk for arrest and socioeconomic
disparities in use, 149 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 108, 114 (2015)).
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It is justifiable to suspend a person’s civil rights in the interests of national security.
Defendants in a criminal case should be required to take the witness stand. 169

The above questions should aid both prosecutors and defense lawyers in identifying authoritarian
jurors. 170 However, while these questions may be effective, such inquiries are only useful if
attorneys decide to use them. Authoritarian jurors have been known to the legal system for many
years, and nearly all of these questions came from studies that occurred in the last century.
Attorneys should understand the enormous problems authoritarian jurors pose for the justice
system, especially after examining the issues surrounding implicit credibility of police officers.
Authoritarians are impacting a justice system where the majority of juries already implicitly
favor the prosecution and police testimony, while simultaneously implicitly disfavoring a
defendant who has the misfortune of simply being different than those in the jury box.171
Authoritarian jurors should have no place in an already imperfect system of justice. All attorneys
in a criminal proceeding should therefore use the above inquiries to identify and remove
malignant authoritarians before their intolerable ideals of justice can infect other jurors.
D. Recommendation Three: Disallow Officers to Testify in Uniform and Sit at the Prosecution’s
Table in Court
Finally, the simple and seemingly practical procedures of officers in the courtroom should be
briefly examined. Specifically, police should not be allowed to testify in uniform. Officers in
uniform have been shown to impact nearby observers in a variety of ways. 172 Such impacts
include feeling safer around a uniformed officer; 173 an increased perception of “competence,
169

See id.; see Mark Bennett, Small Step Toward Scientific Jury Selection, BENNETT & BENNETT
BLOG (June 22, 2010), http://blog.bennettandbennett.com/2010/06/small-step-toward-scientific-juryselection/.
170
Attorneys may also consider that prospective jurors may give false answers due to fear of public scorn
or otherwise. Additional questions exist to identify authoritarian jurors, but the wording of these questions
create at least some doubt in the author’s mind that a juror’s answers would always be truthful (e.g.
“[h]ow would you feel if a family member wanted to marry someone who is [African-American, Muslim,
an exotic dancer, etc.]?”; and “[h]ave you ever been invited to the home of someone who is [homosexual,
Hispanic, Jehovah’s Witness, etc.]?”). See Gayle W. Herde, Take Me to Your Leader: An Examination of
Authoritarianism as an Indicator of Juror Bias, THEJURYEXPERT.COM (Jan. 1, 2009),
http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2009/0 1/take-me-to-your-leader-an-examination-of-authoritarianism-asan-indicator-of-juror-bias/ (citing Douglas J. Narby, Brian Cutler, & Gary Moran, A meta-analysis of the
association between authoritarianism and jurors' perceptions of defendant culpability, 78 J APPLIED
PSYCHOL 34, 34–42 (1993)). These questions should therefore likely be avoided in favor of other
effective and less controversial questions.
171
See Amy Farrell, Liana Pennington, & Shea Cronin, Juror Perceptions of the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities
and Decision Making in Criminal Cases, 38 Law & Soc. Inquiry 773, 793 (2013); Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue:
Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police Officer Witnesses with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV.
245, 256 (2017).
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Ciro Civile & Sukhvinder S. Obhi, Students Wearing Police Uniforms Exhibit Biased Attention toward
Individuals Wearing Hoodies, FRONT. PSYCHOL. (Feb. 6, 2017), http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.
3389/fpsyg.2017.00062/full.
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reliability, intelligence, helpfulness, status, and authority” of the person in uniform; 174 an
increased perceived level of attractiveness of an officer; 175 and other links between the uniform
and “concepts of power and social control.” 176 All of these influences serve to increase the
implicit credibility of police officers and should therefore be left out of the courtroom during an
officer’s testimony.
Furthermore, while there is no prohibition against it, other witnesses generally do not wear
clothing specifically associated with their professions on the stand. In the author’s experience,
firefighters usually do not testify in a flame-retardant outfit, astronauts do not testify in a NASA
jumpsuit, and doctors do not testify in a white coat, with a stethoscope at the ready around their
necks. When viewed through this light, it becomes even more curious as to why officers testify
in uniform. If the criminal justice system truly believes instructing officers to be treated as any
other witness is an effective approach to the problems discussed in this article, then police should
at least be required to dress like one.
In a similar vein, police should not be permitted to sit with the prosecution at their trial table.
Normal witnesses are not generally seen sitting with the prosecution, even when called by the
State. 177 Such an act further diminishes the courts’ instruction to treat officers merely as any
other witness. Therefore, either police should be required to act accordingly, or the courts’
instruction regarding police credibility need to change.
IV. CONCLUSION
The recommendations set forth in this article would help make outcomes fairer in court. While
police officers are an integral part of society and play a vital role in civilization, 178 so too does
the perception of the criminal justice system by the public. Officers cannot continue to be both
“the guardians of society” and merely any other witness in the eyes of the court. The criminal
justice system should strive to illuminate the issues of implicit credibility in relation to police
testimony instead of refusing to address them. While all of the recommendations in this article
should be examined, cautionary jury instructions, in particular, would be an effective way to
address a fundamental problem that has quietly plagued the judiciary for decades.
The Pragmatic Instructions likely present the best way to walk the line between being ineffective
on juries and creating universal untrustworthiness toward officers. Such instructions would
effectively convey the issues discussed in this article and efficiently provide supporting evidence
outlining these problems. Moreover, the Lengthy Instructions could be examined after more
174
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Id.
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Id.
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United States v. Adamo, 882 F.2d 1218, 1235 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding no impropriety when an FBI
agent sat at the prosecution’s table during the trial); United States v. Lee, 834 F.3d 145, 162 (2d Cir.
2016) (finding that an investigative officer in a criminal case can be exempted from witness sequestration
and can remain in the courtroom even when other witnesses are required to leave). Such acts indisputably
treat officers differently than any other witnesses called to testify.
178
See also Thomas Hobbes, LEVIATHAN, OR THE MATTER, FORME & POWER OF A
COMMONWEALTH, ECCLESIASTICALL & CIVIL (1651).
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research has occurred on the problems discussed in this article. Until such study occurs, even
something as diminutive as the Brief Instructions would be a step in the right direction. Although
such a short instruction would likely be relatively ineffective in convincing jurors a problem
exists, at the very least the judiciary would be recognizing an issue in courtrooms across the
United States. Such a change would hopefully crack the door for real change in the future.
Despite the breadth of recommendations discussed in the article, a true fix to this issue is likely
not possible. Potential for abuses will always be present, humans will continue to be imperfect,
and true justice will remain elusive. However, although far from perfect, these recommendations
would make a measurable difference in the impartiality of the criminal justice system today. The
goal of the criminal system should not be to endeavor for perfection, but instead to always strive
towards greater fairness, equality, and objectivity. Such an opportunity presents itself with the
recommendations of this article. While the evolution of the judicial system sometimes feels
excruciatingly slow, it is my hope the issues discussed in this article will be efficiently and
effectively addressed, and one day supplemented by better solutions for ensuring fairness in our
continuing pursuit of justice for all.
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